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Abstract
The combination of two security protocols, a simple
shared-key communicationprotocol and the Difﬁe-Hellman
key distribution protocol, is modeled formally and proved
correct. The modelingis based on the I/O automatonmodel
for distributed algorithms, and the proofs are based on in-
variant assertions, simulation relations, and compositional
reasoning. Arguments about the cryptosystems are handled
separately from arguments about the protocols.
1. Introduction
Security protocolsmust satisfy important correctness re-
quirements, which means that it is important to be able to
think about them clearly and precisely. But they can also
be large and complicated, which makes such reasoning dif-
ﬁcult. One needs ways of decomposing the task intoclearly
separable pieces. Thisincludes separatingdifferent types of
concerns, for example, distributed algorithms issues, cryp-
tosystem computability issues, probabilistic issues, and is-
sues ofaccurate modelingofreality. It alsoincludesdecom-
posingtheprotocolsusingthenormaltechniquesfordecom-
posingdistributedalgorithms,based onlevelsofabstraction
and parallel composition of interacting components.
This paper describes an experiment in modeling and an-
alyzing security protocols, using I/O automata[14, 12] and
the usual techniques that go along with them—a combina-
tion of invariant assertions, simulation relations, and com-
positionalreasoningusingtraces. Theaimoftheexperiment
is to explore how these methods can help in decomposing
the task of reasoning about security protocols. This model
and these methods have been used successfully for decom-
posing the reasoning about many standard distributedalgo-
rithms(see, e.g., [12, 16, 13]), and about several distributed
system designs(see, e.g., [6, 7, 9, 10]), so itis worthdiscov-
ering what they can do for security protocols.
The experiment involves combining simple shared-key
communicationand keydistributionprotocolstoimplement
private communication. In the case we describe in detail
here, simple Difﬁe-Hellman key distribution [4] is used,
the protocols tolerate only passive eavesdroppers, and only
safetypropertiesareconsidered. Inanothercase inprogress,
discussed brieﬂy here, the more complex Difﬁe-Oorschot-
Weiner key distributionprotocol [5], which tolerates adver-
saries that can intrude more actively, is studied. Later work
willincludelivenessguarantees, formulatedintermsoftim-
ing properties.
Our main guideline in studying these protocols is to try
to decompose the reasoning as much as possible, identify-
ing sub-problems that can be treated separately. (Although
the examples in this paper are simple enough to be under-
stood informally, we believe that understanding how best
to decompose them is a good ﬁrst step toward understand-
ing how to decompose more complex examples.) The han-
dling of each piece should be appropriately abstract. For
example, in discussing protocol issues, cryptosystem com-
putabilityissues shouldbesummarized byassumptionssay-
ingthatcertainvaluesare not“easilycomputable”fromoth-
ers; number-theoreticarguments about why these values are
not (likely to be) easily computable should be treated at a
lower level, as mechanisms to achieve the more abstract
non-computability guarantees. Probabilistic issues should
be treated separately, as far as possible. After dividing up
the problems in this way, we expect that the main beneﬁt of
the I/O automaton-based methods will be in clarifying the
distributed algorithm issues. Cryptosystem issues, for ex-
ample, may be better treated by other means, for example,
the inductive techniques of Paulson [15]. However, a gen-
eral frameworkshouldprovidearigorouswayofcombining
the different types of issues.
Intreatingthedistributedalgorithmsthemselves, wesim-
ilarlytrytodecompose them as much as possible. The most
obvious form of decomposition involves treating the two
sub-protocols separately, then tryingto paste them together
using general theorems about automaton composition. An-
other form involves givingvery high level automaton spec-
iﬁcations for services, giving separate descriptions of im-
plementing algorithms, and showing, by means of simula-tion relations, that the algorithms implement the services.
Still another form involves ﬁrst studying a protocol using a
natural, simple cryptosystem, and later trying to show that
its correctness properties extend to modiﬁed versions that
usemore elaboratecryptosystems. Andstillanotherformof
decompositioninvolvescombiningadversaries that interact
with separate protocols into a single “colluding” unit.
Because I/O automata are composed by means of shared
actions, and because we are consideringonly safety proper-
tiesinthispaper, itisnaturaltodescribeexternalbehaviorof
automata in terms of sets of traces (i.e., sequences of exter-
nal actions). The simple trace semantics yields simple and
powerful projectionand pasting theorems (see, e.g., [12], p.
211), for the behavior of compositions of automata. How-
ever, in order to enable compositional reasoning about par-
ticular kinds of properties, the traces must contain all the
information relevant for those properties. For example, in
treatingfault-tolerancepropertiessuchas wait-freetermina-
tion and
f-failure termination compositionally, in terms of
traces, it is convenient to allow the traces to contain special
f
a
i
l inputactionsthat signalthe occurrence offailureevents
(see, e.g., [12, 13]). Sometimes it is convenient to consider
differentstrengthsoffailureactions(e.g., the
g
o
o
d,
b
a
d,and
u
g
l
y failure actions in [7]). Also, in order to treat timing
properties compositionally, it is useful to introduce timing
informationinto the traces.
Inthe case of securityprotocols,important propertiesin-
volve lack of knowledge. To treat this compositionally, one
should include something about knowledge in the traces.
Ourapproachhere istogiveexplicit
l
e
a
r
n inputactionsand
r
e
v
e
a
l output actions by which a component can learn new
information and reveal its knowledge, and to constrain the
component’s behavior in terms of these actions.
Speciﬁcally, the paper contains the following. Section
2 contains math preliminaries. Section 3 presents a model
for cryptosystems, which describe the data types encoun-
tered in the protocols, including (cleartext and ciphertext)
messages, keys, and lower-level data from which keys are
constructed. This data model also describes the functions
that manipulate data, and the reachability (computability)
relationships that say which values can be computed eas-
ily from which others. This model is similar to others in
the literature. Section 4 then describes some “standard”
types of automata that model certain components appearing
inmanysystems—serviceenvironments,insecurechannels,
and eavesdroppers.
Section 5 gives I/O automaton speciﬁcations for the two
main security services considered in this paper—private
communication and key distribution. The speciﬁcation for
private communication is abstract: it talks only about com-
munication and revealed information, and not about keys.
Section 6 models and analyzes the implementation of pri-
vate communication using an abstract key distribution ser-
vice, and Section 7 treats the Difﬁe-Hellman implementa-
tionofkeydistribution. These protocolsuseparticularcryp-
tosystems,andtheprotocolproofsassume thelimitationson
easy computability expressed by those cryptosystems. The
proofs are based on invariant assertions and on simulation
relations relating the protocols to the speciﬁcations for the
services they are intended to implement.
Section 8 shows what is involved in moving from a de-
scriptionof each of the two individualprotocolsin terms of
its own natural cryptosystem to a description in terms of a
common, richer cryptosystem. For example, the shared key
protocol is initially analyzed in terms of abstract, unstruc-
tured keys taken from a simple “shared-key cryptosystem”.
However, when one combines this protocol with Difﬁe-
Hellman,itisnecessary toconsideraversionthatusesstruc-
tured keys, taken from a richer “structured-key cryptosys-
tem”.
Section 9 puts the pieces together, to get an implemen-
tation of private communication that uses shared-key com-
munication with Difﬁe-Hellman key distribution. Most of
this is accomplished automatically from the general projec-
tion and pasting theorems for I/O automata; special argu-
ments must be made for combining the insecure channels
used in the two protocols,and forcombiningthe two adver-
saries intoone. Section10gives a ﬁnal discussion. Because
of limitedspace, most of the proofshave been omitted from
this version; the rest will appear in a technical report [].
Relatedwork: Oftheformalworkonmodelingandana-
lyzingcryptographicprotocols, the efforts that seem closest
inspirittooursare thoseofAbadiandofPaulson. Abadihas
developed a framework for formal study of composable se-
curityprotocols[2, 1], and Paulsonhas developed inductive
reasoning methods, which appear valuable bothfor proving
assertionsandfordeterminingcryptosystemreachabilityre-
lationships[15]. Othershavestatedandprovedinvariantas-
sertions for security protocols, though we do not know of
other work on simulation relations for such protocols. We
alsodonotknowaboutotherworkusingtraces withexplicit
l
e
a
r
n and
r
e
v
e
a
l actions as an approach to compositional
reasoning about security protocols. Wing and Cheiner are
currentlymodelingsecurity protocolsusingthe approach of
thispaper, includingverifyingassertionsusingthePVS the-
orem prover.
Acknowledgments: I thank Ron Rivest for getting me
started on this project and for some very helpful discus-
sions about this project. Martin Abadi, Oleg Cheiner, But-
ler Lampson, Victor Luchangco, Anna Lysyanskaya, Dalia
Malkhi, Mike Reiter, and Jeannette Wing provided useful
comments and encouragement.2. Mathematical Preliminaries
  denotes the empty string. We use I/O automata as de-
ﬁned in [12]. Since we do not deal with liveness in this pa-
per, the tasks are irrelevant. If
A and
B are I/O automata
with the same external signature, then we say that
A imple-
ments
B provided that every trace of
A is also a trace of
B.
Invariantsandsimulationrelationsaredeﬁned, forexample,
in [12].
3. Data Model
This section gives a basic model for the data types used
in the protocols.
3.1. Cryptosystems
A cryptosystem signature
S consists of:
 
T
N
S, a set of type names.
 
F
N
S, a set of function names.
 
d
o
m
a
i
n
S, a mapping from
F
N
S to
(
T
N
S
)
 .
 
r
a
n
g
e
S, a mapping from
F
N
S to
T
N
S.
 
E
N
S
 
F
N
S, a set of easy function names.
A constant name is a function name
f such that
d
o
m
a
i
n
S
(
f
)
=
 . Let
C
N
S
 
F
N
S denote the set
of constant names of
C. We omit the subscript
S where no
confusion seems likely. A cryptosystem
C consists of:
  A cryptosystem signature
s
i
g
C. We write
T
N
C as
shorthand for
T
N
s
i
g
C, etc.
 
s
e
t
C, a mapping from
T
N
C to disjoint sets.
 
f
u
n
C, a mapping from
F
N
C to functions; We require
that if
d
o
m
a
i
n
C
(
f
)
=
(
t
1
 
 
 
 
 
t
k
) and
r
a
n
g
e
C
(
f
)
=
t
then
f
u
n
C
(
f
)
:
s
e
t
C
(
t
1
)
 
 
 
 
 
s
e
t
C
(
t
k
)
 
s
e
t
C
(
t
).
We write
s
e
t
C for
S
t
 
T
N
C
s
e
t
C
(
t
). We omit the subscript
C where no confusion seems likely. If
X
 
f
y
g
 
s
e
t
C, we
say that
y is easily reachable from
X in
C provided that
y
is obtainable startingfrom elements of
X, by applyingonly
functions denoted by function names in
E
N
C.
3.2. Term Cryptosystems
If
S is a cryptosystem signature, then the terms of
S, and
their types, are deﬁned recursively, as follows:
1. If
c
 
C
N
S and
r
a
n
g
e
S
(
c
)
=
t, then
c is a term and
t
y
p
e
S
(
c
)
=
t.
2. If
f
 
F
N
S,
d
o
m
a
i
n
S
(
f
)
=
t
1
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
 
t
k, where
k
 
1,
r
a
n
g
e
S
(
f
)
=
t, and
e
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
k are terms of
types
t
1
 
 
 
 
 
t
k, respectively, then the expression
e
=
f
(
e
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
k
) is a term, and
t
y
p
e
S
(
e
)
=
t.
Let
T
e
r
m
s
S
(
t
) denote the set of terms of
S of type
t. Let
T
e
r
m
s
S denote the set of all terms of
S.
Some of the cryptosystems we consider are best under-
stood as term algebras derived from cryptosystem signa-
tures. In these cases, thevalues ofthe varioustypes are, for-
mally,equivalenceclassesofterms: Anequivalencerelation
R on
T
e
r
m
s
S is said to be a congruence provided that the
followinghold.
1. If
e
R
e
  then
t
y
p
e
S
(
e
)
=
t
y
p
e
S
(
e
 
).
2. Supposethat
f
 
F
N
S,
d
o
m
a
i
n
S
(
f
)
=
t
1
 
t
2
 
 
 
 
 
t
k,
where
k
 
1,
r
a
n
g
e
S
(
f
)
=
t,
e
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
k are terms
oftypes
t
1
 
 
 
 
 
t
k,respectively,
e
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
 
k aretermsof
types
t
1
 
 
 
 
 
t
k, respectively, and for all
i,
1
 
i
 
k,
e
i
R
e
 
i. Then
f
(
e
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
k
)
R
f
(
e
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
k
).
Let
S be a cryptosystem signature and
R a congruence on
T
e
r
m
s
S. Then the term cryptosystem
C for
S and
R is the
unique cryptosystem satisfying:
 
s
i
g
C
=
S.
  If
t
 
T
N
C, then
s
e
t
C
(
t
)istheset ofall
R-equivalence
classes of terms of type
t in
T
e
r
m
s
C.
  If
f
 
F
N
C,
d
o
m
a
i
n
C
(
f
)
=
(
t
1
 
 
 
 
 
t
k
) and
r
a
n
g
e
C
(
f
)
=
t then
f
u
n
C
(
f
) is the function from
s
e
t
C
(
t
1
)
 
 
 
 
 
s
e
t
C
(
t
k
) to
s
e
t
C
(
t
) deﬁned as fol-
lows. Suppose that
e
i
 
s
e
t
C
(
t
i
) for all
i,
1
 
i
 
k. Then
f
u
n
C
(
f
)
(
[
e
1
]
R
 
 
 
 
 
[
e
k
]
R
) is deﬁned to
be
[
f
(
e
1
 
 
 
 
 
e
k
)
]
R. (Since
R is a congruence, this is
well-deﬁned.)
We use the notation
R
C for the congruence relation
R of
C.
If
e
 
T
e
r
m
s
C, then we write
[
e
]
C for the equivalence class
of
ewithrespect to
R
C. Also,if
E
 
T
e
r
m
s
C thenwe write
[
E
]
C for the set of equivalence classes
[
e
]
C for
e
 
E.
3.3. Cryptosystem Examples
In this subsection we give the cryptosystems used later
in the paper. The ﬁrst kind of cryptosystem, a shared-key
cryptosystem, is used in shared key communication. The
second kind, a base-exponent cryptosystem, is used in the
Difﬁe-Hellman protocol. The third kind, a structured-key
cryptosystem,isessentiallyacombinationofthetwoothers.
It is used when the two protocols are combined.3.3.1 Shared-key cryptosystems
A shared-key cryptosystem
C is a term cryptosystem. The
signature
S
=
s
i
g
C is deﬁned as follows.
T
N
S consists of
twotypenames: “
M”formessages and“
K”forkeys.
F
N
S
consists of:
 
e
n
c, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
e
n
c
)
=
(“
M”
 “
K”
) and
r
a
n
g
e
(
e
n
c
)
= “
M”.
 
d
e
c, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
d
e
c
)
=
(“
M”
 “
K”
) and
r
a
n
g
e
(
d
e
c
)
= “
M”.
 
M
C
o
n
s
t
S, a set of message constant names, with
r
a
n
g
e
(
m
)
= “
M” for all
m
 
M
C
o
n
s
t
S.
 
K
C
o
n
s
t
S, a set of key constant names, with
r
a
n
g
e
(
k
)
= “
K” for all
k
 
K
C
o
n
s
t
S.
E
N
S
=
f
e
n
c
 
d
e
c
g. The relation
R is deﬁned by means of
all equations of the form:
 
d
e
c
(
e
n
c
(
m
 
k
)
 
k
)
=
m, where
m
 
k
 
T
e
r
m
s
S,
t
y
p
e
(
m
)
= “
M”,
t
y
p
e
(
k
)
= “
K”.
Speciﬁcally, we want the smallest congruence relation on
T
e
r
m
s
S that equates all terms that are related by the given
equations.
3.3.2 Base-exponent cryptosystems
A base-exponent cryptosystem
C is a term cryptosystem in
which, letting
S
=
s
i
g
C:
T
N
S consists of two type names,
“
B” for bases and “
X” for exponents.
F
N
S consists of:
 
e
x
p, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
e
x
p
)
=
(“
B”
 “
X”
) and
r
a
n
g
e
(
e
x
p
)
= “
B”.
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S, a set of base constant names, with
r
a
n
g
e
(
b
)
= “
B” for all
b
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S.
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S and
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S, two disjoint sets of ex-
ponent constant names, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
x
)
=
  and
r
a
n
g
e
(
x
)
= “
X” for all
x
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S.
E
N
S
=
f
e
x
p
g
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S. The relation
R is deﬁned by
means of all equations of the form:
 
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
b
 
x
)
 
y
)
=
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
b
 
y
)
 
x
),where
b
 
x
 
y
 
T
e
r
m
s
S,
t
y
p
e
(
b
)
= “
B”,
t
y
p
e
(
x
)
=
t
y
p
e
(
y
)
= “
X”.
Deﬁne
B
 
S to be the set of all terms of the form
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
b
 
x
)
 
y
), where
b
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S,
x
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S
and
y
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
2
S. An augmented base-exponent cryp-
tosystem is a base-exponent cryptosystem together with a
distinguishedelement
b
0
S of
B
C
o
n
s
t
S.
3.3.3 Structured-key cryptosystems
Astructured-keycryptosystemisacombinationofashared-
keycryptosystemand a base-exponent cryptosystem, where
certain terms of the base-exponent cryptosystem are iden-
tiﬁed with the keys. A structured-key cryptosystem
C is a
term cryptosystem in which, letting
S
=
s
i
g
C:
T
N
S con-
sists of the type names “
M”, “
B”, and “
X”.
F
N
S consists
of:
 
e
n
c, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
e
n
c
)
=
(“
M”
 “
B”
) and
r
a
n
g
e
(
e
n
c
)
= “
M”.
 
d
e
c, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
d
e
c
)
=
(“
M”
 “
B”
) and
r
a
n
g
e
(
d
e
c
)
= “
M”.
 
e
x
p, with
d
o
m
a
i
n
(
e
x
p
)
=
(“
B”
 “
X”
) and
r
a
n
g
e
(
e
x
p
)
= “
B”.
 
M
C
o
n
s
t
S, a set of message constant names, with
r
a
n
g
e
(
m
)
= “
M” for all
m
 
M
C
o
n
s
t
S.
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S, a set of base constant names, with
r
a
n
g
e
(
b
)
= “
B” for all
b
 
B
C
o
n
s
t.
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S and
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S, two disjoint sets of expo-
nent constant names, with
r
a
n
g
e
(
x
)
= “
X” for all
x
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S.
E
N
S
=
f
e
n
c
 
d
e
c
 
e
x
p
g
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S. The relation
R is de-
ﬁned by means of all equations of the form:
 
d
e
c
(
e
n
c
(
m
 
b
)
 
b
)
=
m, where
m
 
b
 
T
e
r
m
s
S,
t
y
p
e
(
m
)
= “
M”,
t
y
p
e
(
b
)
= “
B”.
 
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
b
 
x
)
 
y
)
=
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
b
 
y
)
 
x
), where
b
 
x
 
y
 
T
e
r
m
s
S,
t
y
p
e
(
b
)
= “
B”,
t
y
p
e
(
x
)
=
t
y
p
e
(
y
)
= “
X”.
Once again, we write
B
 
S for the set of terms of the form
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
b
 
x
)
 
y
), where
b
 
B
C
o
n
s
t
S,
x
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S,
and
y
 
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
S. An augmented structured-key cryp-
tosystem is a structured-key cryptosystem together with a
distinguishedelement
b
0
S of
B
C
o
n
s
t
S.
4. Some Generally-Useful Automata
In this section, we give automaton models for some sys-
tem components that will appear in many settings: environ-
ments for security services, insecure channels, and eaves-
droppers. They are presented in a parameterized fashion so
that they can be used in different contexts. We model these
components as automata (rather than, e.g., by trace proper-
ties) for uniformitywith the way we will model algorithms
and system specs, and because thismakes it possible to rea-
son about them assertionally.4.1. Environment Automata
Hereweassume that
U isauniversalsetofdatavalues,
A
is an arbitrary ﬁnite set of adversary ports, that is, locations
where information can be communicated to the adversary,
and
N
 
U. The environment automaton
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
)
models any entities other than the channels from which an
eavesdropper may learn information. It says that the envi-
ronment is capable of communicating elements of
U at any
adversary port
a
 
A, but infact does not communicate any
elements of
N.
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
) :
Signature:
Input:
None
Output:
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a,
u
 
U,
a
 
A
States:
No variables
Transitions:
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a
Precondition:
u
 
 
N
Effect:
n
o
n
e
4.2. Insecure Channel Automata
Here we assume that
U is a universal set of data values,
P is an arbitrary ﬁnite set of client ports, and
A is an arbi-
trary ﬁnite set of adversary ports. The insecure channel ad-
mits
s
e
n
d and
r
e
c
e
i
v
e actionsforall elements of
U andalso
has
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p outputactions, bywhichinformationintran-
sit passes to an outsider. The insecure channel allows any
message in transit to be communicated to an outsider.
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
):
Signature:
Input:
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
u
)
p
 
q,
u
 
U,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q
Output:
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q,
u
 
U,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
p
 
q
 
a,
u
 
U,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q,
a
 
A
States:
for every
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q:
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
), a multiset of
U, initially empty
Transitions:
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
u
)
p
 
q
Effect:
add
u to
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q
Precondition:
u
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
Effect:
remove one copy of
u
from
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
p
 
q
 
a
Precondition:
u
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
Effect:
n
o
n
e
4.3. Eavesdropper Automata
Here we assume that
C is a cryptosystem,
P is an arbi-
trary ﬁnite set of client ports, and
A is an arbitrary ﬁnite set
of adversary ports. We deﬁne a model for an eavesdropper,
as a nondeterministic automaton
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
).
E
v
e sim-
ply remembers everything it learns and hears, and can re-
veal anything it has, at any time. It does this by maintain-
inga variable
h
a
s, initially
 . The value of
h
a
s may change
onlyinrestrictedways: Namely, when
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
p
 
q
 
a or
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a occurs,
u gets added to
h
a
s. When an internal
c
o
m
p
u
t
e actionoccurs, thevalueresultingfromapplyingan
easy function (one in
E
N
C) to values in
h
a
s may be added
to
h
a
s. We restrict the
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
) output so that
u
 
h
a
s,
that is,
E
v
e can only report a value that it has.
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
):
Signature:
Input:
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
p
 
q
 
a,
u
 
s
e
t
C,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q,
a
 
A
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a,
u
 
s
e
t
C,
a
 
A
Output:
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
u
 
s
e
t
C,
a
 
A
Internal:
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
(
u
 
f
)
a,
f
 
E
N
C,
a
 
A
States:
h
a
s
 
s
e
t
C, initially
 
Transitions:
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
p
 
q
 
a
Effect:
h
a
s
:
=
h
a
s
 
f
u
g
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a
Effect:
h
a
s
:
=
h
a
s
 
f
u
g
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a
Precondition:
u
 
h
a
s
Effect:
n
o
n
e
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
(
u
 
f
)
a
Precondition:
f
u
1
 
 
 
 
 
u
k
g
 
s
 
h
a
s
u
=
f
(
u
1
 
 
 
 
 
u
k
)
Effect:
h
a
s
:
=
h
a
s
 
f
u
g
5. The Services
In this section, we describe the two services that are im-
plementedbytheprotocolsinthispaper. They aredescribed
as automata, which is convenient for assertional reasoning.
The use of input and output actions provides convenient
ways of composing these automata with others, and of de-
scribingwhat is preserved by implementationrelationships.
Forsimplicity,wewritethesespeciﬁcationstodescribeonly
safety properties, althoughthe same methods can be used to
handle liveness properties, formulated as time bounds (see,
e.g., [11, 12]).5.1. Private Communication
This section contains a speciﬁcation of the problem of
achieving private communication among the members of a
ﬁnite collection
P of clients. The speciﬁcation expresses
three properties: (1) only messages that are sent are deliv-
ered, (2) messages are delivered at most once each, and (3)
none of the messages is revealed by an “adversary”. We de-
scribe the problem using a high-level I/O automaton speci-
ﬁcation
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
), where
U is a universal set of data
values,
P is an arbitrary ﬁnite set of client ports,
M
 
U is
a set of messages, and
A is an arbitrary ﬁnite set of adver-
sary ports. This speciﬁcation does not mention distribution
orkeys; these aspects willappear inimplementationsofthis
speciﬁcation, but not in the speciﬁcation itself. The speciﬁ-
cationsimplydescribesthedesiredproperties,as anabstract
machine. As usual forautomaton speciﬁcations, the proper-
ties,listedseparatelyabove,areintermingledinonedescrip-
tion.
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
):
Signature:
Input:
P
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
m
)
p
 
q,
m
 
M,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q
Output:
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q,
u
 
U,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
u
 
U,
a
 
A
States:
for every pair
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q:
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
), a multiset of
M
Transitions:
P
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
m
)
p
 
q
Effect:
add
m to
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q
Precondition:
u
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
Effect:
remove one copy of
u
from
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a
Precondition:
u
 
 
M
Effect:
n
o
n
e
The ﬁrst two properties listed above, which amount to at-
most-once delivery of messages that were actually sent, are
expressed by the transition deﬁnitions for
P
C
 
s
e
n
d and
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e. The thirdproperty,privacy, isexpressed bythe
constraint for
r
e
v
e
a
l.
5.2. Key Distribution
This is a drastically simpliﬁed key distribution service,
which distributes a single key to several participants. We
do not model requests for the keys, but assume that the
service generates the key spontaneously. The simpliﬁed
key distribution problem is speciﬁed by the automaton
K
D
(
U
 
P
 
K
 
A
), where
U is a universal set of data values,
P is an arbitrary ﬁnite set of client ports,
K
 
U is a set of
keys, and
A is a ﬁnite set of adversary ports.
K
D
(
U
 
P
 
K
 
A
):
Signature:
Input:
none
Output:
g
r
a
n
t
(
u
)
p,
u
 
U,
p
 
P
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
u
 
U,
a
 
A
Internal:
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
k
e
y
States:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y, an element of
K
 
f
 
g, initially
 
n
o
t
i
 
e
d
 
P, initially
 
Transitions:
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
k
e
y
Precondition:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
=
 
Effect:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
:
=
choose
k
 
K
g
r
a
n
t
(
u
)
p
Precondition:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
 
=
 
u
=
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
p
 
 
n
o
t
i
 
e
d
Effect:
n
o
t
i
 
e
d
:
=
n
o
t
i
 
e
d
 
f
p
g
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a
Precondition:
u
 
 
K
Effect:
n
o
n
e
6. Implementing Private Communication us-
ing Shared Keys
Thissectiondescribesastraightforwardshared-keycom-
municationprotocol. Theprotocolsimplyusesa sharedkey,
obtained from a key distributionservice, to encode and de-
code messages. Throughout the section, we assume that
C
is a shared-key cryptosystem,
P is a set (of clients) with at
least
2 elements, and
A is a nonempty ﬁnite set (of adver-
saries).
6.1. The Encoder and Decoder
We deﬁne parameterized encoder and decoder automata,
parameterized by the shared-key cryptosystem
C, the set
P
of clients, and elements
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q. Note that, in the
code for
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
u
), we are usingthe abbreviation
e
n
c for
f
u
n
C
(
e
n
c
) – that is, we are suppressing mention of the par-
ticular cryptosystem
C.
E
n
c
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q, where
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q :
Signature:Input:
P
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
m
)
p
 
q,
m
 
[
M
C
o
n
s
t
C
]
g
r
a
n
t
(
u
)
p,
u
 
s
e
t
C
Output:
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
u
)
p
 
q,
u
 
s
e
t
C
States:
b
u
 
e
r, a multiset of elements of
[
M
C
o
n
s
t
C
], initially empty
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
[
K
C
o
n
s
t
C
]
 
f
 
g, initially
 
Transitions:
P
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
m
)
p
 
q
Effect:
add
m to
b
u
 
e
r
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
u
)
p
 
q
Precondition:
m is in
b
u
 
e
r
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
=
 
u
=
e
n
c
(
m
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
)
Effect:
remove one copy of
m
from
b
u
 
e
r
g
r
a
n
t
(
u
)
p
Effect:
if
u
 
[
K
C
o
n
s
t
C
] then
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
:
=
u
More-or-less symmetrically, we have:
D
e
c
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q, where
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q :
Signature:
Input:
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q,
u
 
s
e
t
C
g
r
a
n
t
(
u
)
q,
u
 
s
e
t
C
Output:
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q,
u
 
s
e
t
C
States:
b
u
 
e
r, a multiset of elements of
s
e
t
C
(“
M”
), initially empty
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
[
K
C
o
n
s
t
C
]
 
f
 
g, initially
 
Transitions:
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q
Effect:
if
u
 
s
e
t
C
(“
M”
) then
add
u to
b
u
 
e
r
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
u
)
p
 
q
Precondition:
m is in
b
u
 
e
r
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
=
 
u
=
d
e
c
(
m
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
)
Effect:
remove one copy of
m
from
b
u
 
e
r
g
r
a
n
t
(
u
)
q
Effect:
if
u
 
[
K
C
o
n
s
t
C
] then
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
:
=
u
6.2. The Complete Implementation
In the rest of this section, we assume:
U
=
s
e
t
C;
M
=
[
M
C
o
n
s
t
C
];
K
=
[
K
C
o
n
s
t
C
];
N
=
M
 
K;
U
  is an arbi-
trary set with
K
 
U
 ;
A
  is an arbitrary set, disjoint from
A.
1,2￿
PC-receive￿
PC-send￿
2,1￿
KD￿
IC￿
Eve￿
Env￿
Enc￿
Dec￿ Enc￿
Dec￿
reveal￿
4￿
IC-receive￿
1,2￿
2,1￿
1,2￿
eavesdrop￿
IC-send￿
2,1￿
reveal￿
learn￿
3￿
3￿
1,2￿
2,1￿
PC-send￿
1,2￿
PC-receive￿
2,1￿
IC-send￿
1,2￿
IC-receive￿
2,1￿
3￿
Figure 1.
S
1;
P
=
f1,2
g,
A
=
f3
g;
A
 
=
f4
g
The implementation consists of encoder and decoder
components, an insecure channel, eavesdropper and envi-
ronment,plusa keydistributionservice. Moreprecisely, the
implementation,
S
1
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
), is obtained by com-
posing the following automata and then hiding certain ac-
tions.
 
E
n
c
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
D
e
c
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q.
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
),
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
),
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
).
 
K
D
(
U
 
 
P
 
K
 
A
 
), a key distributionservice.
In this system, the eavesdropper
E
v
e does not acquire any
information directly from the
K
D component. Later, in
Section 9, we combine this eavesdropper with another that
arises in the key distributionservice implementation.
Toget
S
1
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
), we hidethefollowingactions
in the composition just deﬁned:
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
p
 
q
 
a,
p
 
q
 
P,
a
 
A;
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
p
 
q,
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P;
g
r
a
n
t
p,
p
 
P;
l
e
a
r
n
a,
a
 
A;
r
e
v
e
a
l
a,
a
 
A
 . We sometimes
omit explicit mention of parameters of
S
1, or of other sys-
tems and components, when we think that confusion is un-
likely. Figure 1 contains an interaction diagram for
S
1.
Our system model says that the eavesdropper learns no
elements of
N
=
M
 
K from outsidesources. That choice
of
N is ﬁne for thisprotocol,but we donot now have a gen-
eralprescriptionforhowtochoose“good”sets
N forallpro-
tocols. (“Good”heremeansthattheset shouldhaveasimple
deﬁnition, should be large enough to include all values that
the adversary coulduse tobreak the protocol,and shouldbe
small enoughtoexclude values producedbyotherprotocols
with which the given protocol is to be composed.)6.3. Invariants
In system
S
1, we use
E
n
c
p
 
q,
D
e
c
p
 
q,
I
C,
E
v
e, and
K
D
as “handles” to help in naming state variables in the com-
posedstate. Thishandlenaming deviceforstate variablesis
taken from Vaziri’s work [17]. The ﬁrst invariant says that
the keys granted by the key distributionservice are consis-
tent.
Lemma 6.1 In all reachable states of
S
1, the followingare
true:
1. If
E
n
c
p
 
q
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
=
  then
E
n
c
p
 
q
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
=
K
D
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y.
2. If
D
e
c
p
 
q
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
=
  then
D
e
c
p
 
q
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
=
K
D
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y.
The next invariant says that no
N elements appear in
E
v
e
 
h
a
s or in the insecure channel.
Lemma 6.2 In all reachable states of
S
1, the followingare
true:
1. For all
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q, and all
u
 
N,
u
 
 
I
C
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
).
2. If
u
 
N then
u
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s.
Lemma 6.3 In all reachable states of
S
1, the followingare
true:
1. If
u
 
N then
uisnoteasilyreachable from
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C.
Theproofsoftheﬁrst twoofthese invariantsare straight-
forward inductivearguments. In some of the steps (e.g., the
I
C
 
s
e
n
d stepsinPart 1ofLemma 6.2), factsabout thecryp-
tosystemare used (inthiscase, some inequivalencefacts for
terms). The third invariant follows from the second.
6.4. Implementation Proof
We show that
S
1 implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
), using a
simulation relation from
S
1 to
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
). The rela-
tion
F is deﬁned by saying that
(
s
 
t
)
 
F provided that the
followingconditionholds:
Foreach
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q,
t
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)isthemultisetunion
of three multisets,
A
1
 
A
2
 
A
3, of
U, where:
1.
A
1
=
s
 
E
n
c
p
 
q
 
b
u
 
e
r.
2.
A
2
=
d
e
c
(
s
 
I
C
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
)
 
s
 
K
D
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
) if
s
 
K
D
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
 
=
  else
 .
3.
A
3
=
d
e
c
(
s
 
D
e
c
p
 
q
 
b
u
 
e
r
 
s
 
K
D
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
) if
s
 
K
D
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
 
=
  else
 .
That is, each high-levelmultisetofmessages intransitisob-
tained from the messages in the buffers at the encoder and
decoder, plusthose intransit inthe low-level insecure chan-
nels. The messages in the insecure channels and in the de-
coder buffer must be decoded for the correspondence.
Theorem 6.4
F is a simulationrelation.
Proof: By standardassertional methodsfor provingsimula-
tions,see, e.g., [12], p. 225. The invariantsofthe preceding
section are used here.
Theorem 6.5
S
1
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
Proof: Follows from Theorem 6.4.
7. Difﬁe-Hellman Key Distribution Protocol
This section describes the Difﬁe-Hellman key distribu-
tion protocol. Throughout the section, we assume
C is an
augmentedbase-exponentcryptosystem,
P
=
f
p
1
 
p
2
g,and
A is a nonempty set.
7.1. The Endpoint Automata
We deﬁne twosymmetric automata, forthe twoelements
of
P.
D
H
(
C
 
P
)
p
1:
Signature:
Input:
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
b
)
p
2
 
p
1,
b
 
s
e
t
C
(“
B”
)
Output:
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
b
)
p
1
 
p
2,
b
 
s
e
t
C
(“
B”
)
g
r
a
n
t
(
b
)
p
1,
b
 
s
e
t
C
(“
B”
)
Internal:
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
e
x
p
p
1
States:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
]
 
f
 
g, initially
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
e
n
t, a Boolean, initially
f
a
l
s
e
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
e
t
C
(“
B”
)
 
f
 
g, initially
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d, a Boolean, initially
f
a
l
s
e
Derived variables:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
e
t
C
(“
B”
)
 
f
 
g, given by:
if
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
=
  then
e
x
p
(
[
b
0
C
]
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
) else
 
Transitions:c
h
o
o
s
e
 
e
x
p
p
1
Precondition:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
=
 
Effect:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
:
=
choose
x
 
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
]
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
(
b
)
p
1
 
p
2
Precondition:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
=
 
b
=
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e
b
a
s
e
 
s
e
n
t
=
f
a
l
s
e
Effect:
b
a
s
e
 
s
e
n
t
:
=
t
r
u
e
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
(
b
)
p
2
 
p
1
Effect:
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
:
=
b
g
r
a
n
t
(
b
)
p
1
Precondition:
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
=
 
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
 
=
 
b
=
e
x
p
(
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
)
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
=
f
a
l
s
e
Effect:
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
:
=
t
r
u
e
The automaton for
p
2 is the same, but interchanges uses
of
p
1 and
p
2, and likewise of
X
C
o
n
s
t
  and
X
C
o
n
s
t
 .
7.2. The Complete Implementation
In the rest of this section, we assume:
U
=
s
e
t
C;
K
=
[
B
 
C
];
X
=
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
]
 
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
];
N
=
K
 
X.
The implementation consists of two endpoint automata,
an insecure channel, an eavesdropper and an environment.
Speciﬁcally, implementation
S
2
(
C
 
P
 
A
)isthecomposition
of the followingautomata, with certain actions hidden:
 
D
H
(
C
 
P
)
p,
p
 
P, endpoint automata.
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
),
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
),
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
).
To get
S
2
(
C
 
P
 
A
), we hide:
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
p
 
q
 
a,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q,
a
 
A;
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
p
 
q,
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q;
l
e
a
r
n
a,
a
 
A. Figure 2 containsan interactiondiagram for
S
2.
7.3. Invariants
In system
S
2, we use
D
H
(
p
) for
p
 
P,
I
C, and
E
v
e as
handles to help in naming state variables in the composed
state. The ﬁrst invariant says that messages that have been
received or are in transit are correct:
Lemma 7.1 In all reachable states of
S
2, the followingare
true:
1. If
D
H
(
p
)
 
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
 
=
  and
q
 
=
p then
D
H
(
q
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
=
 , and
D
H
(
q
)
 
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
=
D
H
(
p
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e.
2. If
u
 
I
C
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
), then
D
H
(
p
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
=
 ,
and
u
=
D
H
(
p
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e.
Lemma 7.2 In all reachable states of
S
2, the followingare
true:
1. For all
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q, and all
u
 
N,
u
 
 
I
C
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
).
grant￿ 2￿ grant￿ 2￿
DH￿ IC￿ DH￿
Eve￿
Env￿
eavesdrop￿
reveal￿
IC-send￿
IC-receive￿
learn￿
IC-send￿
IC-receive￿ 1￿
1,2￿
2,1￿
2￿
2,1￿
1,2￿
4￿
4￿
4￿
Figure 2.
S
2;
P
=
f1,2
g;
A
=
f4
g
2. If
u
 
N then
u
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s.
Lemma 7.3 In all reachable states of
S
2, the followingare
true:
1. If
u
 
N then
uisnoteasilyreachable from
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C.
7.4. Implementation Proof
We show that
S
2 implements
K
D
(
U
 
P
 
K
 
A
) using a
simulationrelation. The relation
F is deﬁned by sayingthat
(
s
 
t
)
 
F provided that:
1. If
s
 
D
H
(
p
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
 
=
  for all
p
 
P, then
t
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
=
e
x
p
(
s
 
D
H
(
p
1
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
 
D
H
(
p
2
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
),
and otherwise
t
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y
=
 .
2.
t
 
n
o
t
i
 
e
d
=
f
p
 
P
:
s
 
D
H
(
p
)
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
g.
Theorem 7.4
F is a simulationrelation.
Proof: By induction.
Base: Easy.
Inductive step: Consider
(
s
 
 
 
s
 
) and
t and consider cases.
The most interesting cases are:
1.
 
=
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
e
x
p
p.
If
s
 
D
H
(
q
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
=
 , where
q
 
=
p then this
maps to the trivial one-state execution fragment
t.
The correspondence is trivially preserved (part 1 is
vacuous). Otherwise, this corresponds to
c
h
o
o
s
e
 
k
e
y,with a chosen value of
e
x
p
(
s
 
 
D
H
(
p
1
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
 
 
D
H
(
p
2
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
).
Enabling is straightforward, as is the preservation of
the simulation.
2.
 
=
g
r
a
n
t
(
b
)
p
This corresponds to
g
r
a
n
t
(
b
)
p in the speci-
ﬁcation. The interesting fact to show here
is the enabling, speciﬁcally, that the value
b
=
e
x
p
(
s
 
D
H
(
p
)
 
r
c
v
d
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
 
D
H
(
p
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
)
is equal to
t
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y. But Lemma 7.1 implies that
b
=
e
x
p
(
s
 
D
H
(
q
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
b
a
s
e
 
s
 
D
H
(
p
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
).
and equations in the cryptosystem imply that this is
equal to
e
x
p
(
e
x
p
(
[
b
0
]
 
s
 
D
H
(
p
1
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
)
 
s
 
D
H
(
p
2
)
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
e
x
p
). But the deﬁnition of
F says that this is
equal to
t
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
k
e
y, as needed.
3.
 
=
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a
This corresponds to
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a in the speciﬁcation.
We must show that
u
 
 
K. The precondition for
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a (in
E
v
e) implies that
u
 
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s.
Lemma 7.2 implies that
u
 
 
N, which implies that
u
 
 
K.
Theorem 7.5
S
2
(
C
 
P
 
A
) implements
K
D
(
U
 
P
 
K
 
A
).
Proof: By Theorem 7.4.
8. Algorithms Using Structured-Key Cryp-
tosystems
In thissection, we extend the implementationsof private
communication and of key distribution so that they use a
structured-key cryptosystem, in place of a shared key cryp-
tosystem orbase-exponent cryptosystem. For the rest ofthe
paper, ﬁx
C to be any augmented structured-key cryptosys-
tem.
8.1. Private Communication
8.1.1 Notation and assumptions
We deﬁne a shared-key cryptosystem
C
  directly from
C, by
sayingthat
M
C
o
n
s
t
C
 
=
M
C
o
n
s
t
C and
K
C
o
n
s
t
C
 
=
B
 
C.
That is, we use the
B
  terms in
C as “names” for keys in
C
 . In thissubsection, we assume:
P is an arbitrary set with
at least
2 elements;
A is an arbitrary set;
U
=
s
e
t
C;
M
=
[
M
C
o
n
s
t
C
];
K
=
[
B
 
C
];
X
=
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
]
 
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
].
Also,
W is the set of all elements
w
 
s
e
t
C
(“
M”
)
that can be obtained as follows: In cryptosystem
C,
w is
obtained from an element
m
 
s
e
t
C
 
(“
M”
) by applying
some number of
e
n
c operations with second arguments in
s
e
t
C
(
\
B
 
 
)
 
K. (That is,
w is obtained by “wrapping” the
element.) Furthermore,
N
=
W
 
K
 
X;
U
 
=
U
=
s
e
t
C;
A
  is an arbitrary set, disjoint from
A.
The most interesting part of this is the deﬁnition of
W,
whichisintendedtodesignatetheelementsoftype“
M”that
are to be avoided. Set
W must be sufﬁciently large to in-
clude all elements of type “
M” that could help to compute
elementsthataresupposedtoremainunknown. But
W must
be sufﬁcientlysmall toexclude elements that mightbe com-
municated in other protocols with which the present proto-
col is going to be composed. And,
W must be deﬁned rea-
sonablysimply. Comingup witha goodchoice of
W seems
at this point to be something of an art, similar to coming up
with a good invariant.
The choice we have made above is one of several possi-
bilities. We think it looks a little messy, especially because
it does not fall into a formalized style that might suggest
howsimilardeﬁnitionsmightbemade formorecomplicated
protocols. A simpler choice that would work for this pa-
per would be
W
=
s
e
t
C
(“
M”
), but that seems to be rul-
ing out more than would be ideal. Another choice wouldbe
a smaller
W, for instance the set of elements of
U that are
easilyreachable from
M
 
(
s
e
t
C
(
\
B
 
 
)
 
K
) in
C. We leave
this for later work.
8.1.2 New encoder and decoder automata
The formal deﬁnitionsof
E
n
c
  and
D
e
c
  are nearly identi-
cal to those of
E
n
c and
D
e
c. The difference is that the new
automata use elements of type “
B” in place of
K
C
o
n
s
t. Of
course, the parameters have new meanings, as deﬁned just
above.
8.1.3 New implementation
We deﬁne
S
3 tobe the algorithmfrom Section 6, but imple-
mented usingthe structured-keycryptosystem
C rather than
a shared key cryptosystem. That is,
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) is
the composition of the following automata, with some ac-
tions hidden:
 
E
n
c
 
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q and
D
e
c
 
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q.
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
),
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
),
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
).
 
K
D
(
U
 
 
P
 
K
 
A
 
).
To get
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
), we hide:
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
p
 
q
 
a,
p
 
q
 
P,
a
 
A;
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
p
 
q,
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P;
g
r
a
n
t
p,
p
 
P;
l
e
a
r
n
a,
a
 
A;
r
e
v
e
a
l
a,
a
 
A
 . We want to show
that this system implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
).8.1.4 Invariants
Lemma 8.1 In all reachable states of
S
3, the followingare
true:
1. For all
p,
E
n
c
 
p
 
q
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
K
 
f
 
g.
2. For all
p,
D
e
c
 
p
 
q
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
k
e
y
 
K
 
f
 
g.
3. For all
p
 
q, if
u
 
I
C
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
) then
u
=
e
n
c
(
m
 
k
), where
m
 
M and
k
 
K.
4. For all
p
 
q, all
x
 
X,
x
 
 
I
C
 
b
u
 
e
r
(
p
 
q
).
Lemma 8.2 In all reachable states of
S
3, the followingare
true:
1. No element of
X is in
E
v
e
 
h
a
s.
2. Assume that
(
M
 
K
)
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
=
 . If
w
 
W
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s and
v
 
s
e
t
C
 
(“
M”
)iseasilyreachablefrom
f
w
g
 
(
s
e
t
C
(
\
B
 
 
)
 
K
) in
C, then
v
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s.
Part2ofinvariant8.2hasasomewhatdifferentstylefrom
thosewehaveusedsofar. Itbasicallysaysthatifa“wrapped
version”of an element of
s
e
t
C
 
(“
M”
) isin
h
a
s, thentheac-
tual element of
s
e
t
C
 
(“
M”
) must also be there. Note that
we did not give any invariants here saying that
K elements
or
M elements do not appear in
E
v
e
 
h
a
s, as we did in Sec-
tion 6.3. This is because (in the interests of decomposition)
we are trying to avoid proving facts that have already been
proved for the more abstract version of the algorithm. In-
stead, we are trying to rely on the simulation relation, de-
scribed in the next subsection, to give such facts.
8.1.5 Implementation proof
We prove the correctness of
S
3 as a consequence of that of
the analogous system
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
). Byour previous
result about
S
1, Theorem 6.5:
Lemma 8.3
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) implements
P
C
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
In order to prove correctness of
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
),
we would like to demonstrate a simulation relationship
from
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) to
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
). To do
this, we ﬁrst make the interfaces consistent, by deﬁn-
ing
S
 
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) from
S
3 by hiding the actions
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 .
Lemma 8.4 If
  is a trace of
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) then
 
withall
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)actionsremoved,
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 ,isatrace
of
S
 
3
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
).
Nowwedeﬁnetherelation
F from
S
 
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
)to
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
):
(
s
 
t
)
 
F provided:
1. For all components except
E
v
e, all state components
are identical.
2. If
u
 
s
e
t
C
  and
uiseasilyreachable from
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
N
) in
C then
u is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
(
M
 
K
)
) in
C
 .
Theorem 8.5
F is a simulationrelation.
Proof: For the initial condition, let
s and
t be the unique
start states of
S
 
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) and
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
),
respectively. We must check that
(
s
 
t
)
 
F. The key is
to show that if
u
 
s
e
t
C
  and
u is easily reachable from
U
 
(
W
 
K
 
X
) in
C then
u is easily reachable from
s
e
t
C
 
 
(
M
 
K
) in
C
 . But properties of the cryptosystem
imply that there is no such element
u, so this is vacuously
true. For the step condition, the most interesting cases are:
1.
 
=
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
a
 
A
We must show that
u
 
 
M. So suppose for the sake
of contradiction that
u
 
M. By the precondition,
we know that
u
 
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s. Since
u
 
s
e
t
C
 , the
deﬁnition of
F implies that
u is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
(
M
 
K
)
) in
C
 . But Lemma 6.3
implies that no element of
M is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
(
M
 
K
)
) in
C
 . This yields the
needed contradiction.
2.
 
=
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
(
u
 
f
)
This maps to the trivial fragment. We must argue that
(
s
 
 
t
)
 
F. It sufﬁces to show that any element
u
 
s
e
t
C
  that is easily reachable from
s
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) is also easily reachable from
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
). But this follows from general properties of the
c
o
m
p
u
t
e action in
E
v
e.
3.
 
=
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a
We consider two cases:
(a)
u
 
s
e
t
C
 
Then the corresponding fragment consists of a
single step, withthe same action. To see that this
is enabled, note that
u
 
 
N, by the precondition
in
S
 
3. In particular,
u
 
 
M
 
K. This implies
that
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
) is enabled in
S
1.
To show that
(
s
 
 
t
 
)
 
F, suppose that
v
 
s
e
t
C
 
and
v iseasily reachable from
s
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
)in
C. Thensince
u
 
U
 
N,wehavealsothat
v iseasilyreachable from
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
)in
C. Then since
(
s
 
t
)
 
F, we have that
v is easily
reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
(
M
 
K
)
)in
C
 , which implies that
v is easily reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
(
M
 
K
)
) in
C
 . Thisproves
that
(
s
 
 
t
 
)
 
F.(b)
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 
Then the corresponding fragment consists of the
single state
t. We must show that
(
s
 
 
t
)
 
F. It
sufﬁces toshowthatanyelement
v
 
s
e
t
C
  thatis
easily reachable from
s
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C
isalsoeasilyreachablefrom
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
)
in
C. But the precondition implies that
u
 
U
 
N, so
s
 
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
)
=
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
), so this is obvious.
Theorem 8.6
S
 
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) implements
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
).
Lemma 8.7 If
  is a trace of
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) then
 
with all
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
) actions removed, for
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 , is
a trace of
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
).
Proof: By Theorem 8.6 and Lemma 8.4.
Theorem 8.8
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
) implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
Proof: By Lemmas 8.7 and 8.3. Let
  be a trace of
S
3
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
). Then Lemma 8.7 implies that
 
1 is a
trace of
S
1
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
 
U
 
 
A
 
), where
 
1 is equal to
  with
all
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
) actions removed, for
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 . Then
Lemma 8.3impliesthat
 
1 isatraceof
P
C
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
It follows that
 
1 is a trace of
P
C
(
s
e
t
C
 
P
 
M
 
A
). Now,
since
  differs from
 
1 only by including some
r
e
v
e
a
l ac-
tions for elements in
U
 
s
e
t
C
 , it follows that
  is a trace
of
P
C
(
s
e
t
C
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
The proofs of the results in this and the next subsection
deal with speciﬁc cryptosystems. It would be interesting to
extract general theorems that could be applied to get such
results. Such theorems would involve some kind of notion
of “embedding” of one cryptosystem in another, and state-
ments articulating when a protocol that works with a cryp-
tosystem also works with any cryptosystem in which that
cryptosystem is embedded.
8.2. Key Distribution
8.2.1 Notation and assumptions
We deﬁne an augmented base-exponent cryptosystem
C
 
directly from
C, by saying
B
C
o
n
s
t
C
 
=
B
C
o
n
s
t
C,
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
 
=
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C,
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
 
=
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C, and
b
0
C
 
=
b
0
C. In this subsection, we assume:
P
=
f
p
1
 
p
2
g;
A is an arbitrary set;
U
=
s
e
t
C;
K
=
[
B
 
C
];
X
=
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
]
 
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
];
N
=
K
 
X.
8.2.2 New implementation
Thenewendpointautomataaresyntacticallythesame as the
old endpoint automata. The only difference is that the sub-
script
C nowreferstoastructured-keycryptosystem. Wede-
ﬁne
S
4 tobe thealgorithmfromSection7, but implemented
using the structured-key cryptosystem
C rather than a base-
exponent cryptosystem. That is,
S
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
) is the compo-
sitionof the followingautomata, with some actions hidden:
 
D
H
(
C
 
P
)
p,
p
 
P.
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
),
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
),
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
).
To get
S
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
), we hide:
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
p
 
q
 
a,
p
 
q
 
P,
a
 
A;
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
p
 
q,
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P;
l
e
a
r
n
a,
a
 
A. We
want toshow that this system implements
K
D
(
U
 
P
 
K
 
A
).
We prove the correctness of
S
4 as a consequence of that
of the analogous system
S
2
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
). By our previous re-
sult about
S
2, Theorem 7.5:
Lemma 8.9
S
2
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
) implements
K
D
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
P
 
K
 
A
).
Lemma 8.10 If
  is a trace of
S
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
) then
  with all
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
) actions removed, for
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 , is a trace of
S
 
4
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
).
Now we deﬁne the relation
F from
S
 
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
) to
S
2
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
):
(
s
 
t
)
 
F provided:
1. For all components except
E
v
e, all state components
are identical.
2. If
u
 
s
e
t
C
  and
uiseasilyreachable from
s
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
N
) in
C then
u is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
 
h
a
s
 
(
s
e
t
C
 
 
N
) in
C
 .
Theorem 8.11
F is a simulationrelation.
Proof: Analogous to that of Theorem 8.5.
Theorem 8.12
S
 
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
) implements
S
2
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
).
Lemma 8.13 If
  is a trace of
S
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
) then
  with all
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
) actions removed, for
u
 
U
 
s
e
t
C
 , is a trace of
S
2
(
C
 
 
P
 
A
).
Theorem 8.14
S
4
(
C
 
P
 
A
) implements
K
D
(
U
 
P
 
K
 
A
).
9. Putting the Pieces Together
Now we describe how to put the previous results to-
gether, to get an implementation of private communication
that uses the shared-key communication protocol in combi-
nationwiththeDifﬁe-Hellmankeydistributionservice. The
ﬁrststepcombinesthetwoprotocols,butstillkeepstheinse-
cure channels, eavesdroppers, and environmentsfor thetwo
algorithmsseparate. Thesecondstepcombinethetwochan-
nels intoone and likewise for the eavesdroppers and the en-
vironments.IC￿ DH￿ DH￿
Eve￿
Env￿
Dec￿
Eve￿
Env￿
Enc￿
IC￿
Dec￿
Enc￿
eavesdrop￿
reveal￿ learn￿
grant￿
eavesdrop￿
reveal￿
learn￿
2￿
4￿
4￿
4￿
1,2￿
2,1￿
1,2￿
2,1￿
3￿
3￿
3￿
1￿
Figure 3.
S
5
9.1. Composing Difﬁe-Hellman and Shared-Key
Communication to get Private Communica-
tion
Recall that we have already ﬁxed
C to be an augmented
structured-key cryptosystem. We now ﬁx, for the rest of
the paper:
U
=
s
e
t
C;
P
=
f
p
1
 
p
2
g;
P
 
=
f
p
1
 
 
p
2
 
g;
A is an arbitrary set;
M
=
[
M
C
o
n
s
t
C
];
K
=
[
B
 
C
];
X
=
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
]
 
[
X
C
o
n
s
t
 
C
];
W is the set of elements
of
s
e
t
C
(“
M”
) that can be obtained from
s
e
t
C
 
(“
M”
)
 
(
s
e
t
C
(
\
B
 
 
)
 
K
) in
C using
e
n
c;
N
=
W
 
K
 
X;
A
  is
an arbitrary set, disjoint from
A. The combined system
S
5
consists of the followingpieces:
 
E
n
c
 
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
D
e
c
 
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q.
 
D
H
 
p,
p
 
P; each of these is a renamed ver-
sion of
D
H
(
C
 
P
)
p, with the subscripts in
I
C
 
s
e
n
d
p
 
q
and
I
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
q
 
p actions renamed totheirprimedver-
sions.
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
),
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
),
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
).
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
 
A
 
),
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
),
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
 
N
 
).
S
5 hides all the actions except for the
P
C
 
s
e
n
d,
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e, and
r
e
v
e
a
l
a actions for
a
 
A.
Figure 3 contains an interaction diagram for
S
5.
Theorem 9.1
S
5 implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
Proof:ThisfollowsfromTheorems 8.14and8.8,usinggen-
eral projection and pasting lemmas for I/O automata.
9.2. Merging Channels, Adversaries, and Environ-
ments
The ﬁnal implementation,
S
6, is obtained from
S
5 by
merging the two separate insecure channels into one, and
likewise for the two adversaries and the two environments.
To do this, and yet keep the same interfaces, we extend
the deﬁnitions of
I
C and
E
v
e to allow two types of ports,
primed and unprimed. Speciﬁcally,
S
6 consists of:
 
E
n
c
 
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
D
e
c
 
(
C
 
P
)
p
 
q,
p
 
q
 
P,
p
 
=
q.
 
D
H
 
p,
p
 
P.
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
 
P
 
 
A
 
).
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
P
 
 
A
 
).
 
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
A
 
 
N
 
N
 
).
Here, the extended
I
C is the same as
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
P
 
 
A
 
A
 
) but only has actions with subscripts
p
 
q
 
awhere either
p
 
q
 
P,
a
 
A or
p
 
q
 
P
 ,
a
 
A
 . Similarly for
the extended
E
v
e. Also,
S
6 hides all actions except for the
P
C
 
s
e
n
d,
P
C
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e, and
r
e
v
e
a
l
a actions for
a
 
A.
The combinedeavesdroppereavesdrops andlearns onall
adversary ports in
A
 
A
 , and can use all this informa-
tion in calculating its
h
a
s information, which resides in a
single state component. The combined environment avoids
communicating any information in
N
 
N
 . We claim
that
S
6 implements
S
5, which implies that
S
6 implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
). To prove this result, we deﬁne
S
7, which
isjust like
S
5 except that it combinesthe eavesdroppers, but
not the channels or environments.
Lemma 9.2
S
7 implements
S
5.
The essence of this lemma is that information that an
eavesdropper can acquire in either protocol does not upset
the requirements of the other protocol. It would be nice to
showthat
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
 
P
 
 
A
 
) implements
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
). But thisis not quitecorrect: the implemen-
tation relationship requires assumptions about the contexts
in which the eavesdroppers run, (and also, the relationship
does not preserve the
l
e
a
r
n actions). So we just prove an
implementation relationship for the eavesdroppers in their
contexts. However, it is clear that the argument uses only
minimal information about the particular contexts, namely,
what kind of information they can contribute in
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
and
l
e
a
r
n actions; it should be possible to extract a general
lemma stating these restrictions on contexts explicitly.
Proof:Weusea simulationrelation
F from
S
7 to
S
5 deﬁned
so that
(
s
 
t
)
 
F exactly if:
1. Everythingexcept for
h
a
s components isthe same in
s
and
t.2. If
u
 
s
 
h
a
s then
u is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C.
3. If
u
 
s
 
h
a
s then
u is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
) in
C.
Thismappingsays, essentially, that anyinformationthatthe
combined eavesdropper acquires is something that either of
the individual eavesdroppers could have acquired anyway.
We show that this is a simulation. The initial conditionsare
immediate, because
s
 
h
a
s is empty. We consider steps:
1.
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
a
 
A
We know that
u
 
s
 
h
a
s. So by deﬁnition
of
F, we have that
u is easily reachable from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
). Let this step corre-
spond to a sequence of
l
e
a
r
n
a and
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
a actions
sufﬁcient to put
u into
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s, followed by
the same
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a action. The sequence of learns
and computes guarantees that the action is enabled in
the spec.
2.
r
e
v
e
a
l
(
u
)
a,
a
 
A
 
Analogous to the previous case.
3.
l
e
a
r
n
(
u
)
a,
a
 
A
 
A
 
Map this to the trivial execution fragment. By the
precondition, this adds something in
U
 
(
N
 
N
 
) to
s
 
h
a
s. But this is obviously easily reach-
able from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) and from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
). So the correspon-
dence is preserved.
4.
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
(
u
 
f
)
a,
a
 
A
 
A
 
Map to the trivial fragment. The precondition im-
plies that
u is easily reachable from
s
 
h
a
s. By
the inductive step, all the elements of
s
 
h
a
s that
are needed for this computation are easily reach-
able from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) and from
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
). So
u is also easily
reachablefrom
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
)andfrom
t
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
)(usingonemorestep).
5.
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
a,
a
 
A
Then Lemma 8.1 implies that
u is of the form
e
n
c
(
m
 
k
),
m
 
M,
k
 
K. Therefore,
u
 
U
 
N
 .
Let this correspond to the same action in the spec.
We must show that
(
s
 
 
t
 
)
 
F. This means
we must show that
u is easily reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C and
u is easily
reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
) in
C.
By the effect of the action in the spec,
u
 
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s, so
uisobviouslyeasilyreachable
from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C. Also, since
u
 
U
 
N
 ,
u is obviously easily reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
) in
C.
6.
e
a
v
e
s
d
r
o
p
(
u
)
a,
a
 
A
 
Then
u is of the form
e
x
p
(
b
0
 
x
)
 
U
 
N Let
this correspond to the same action in the spec.
We must show that
(
s
 
 
t
 
)
 
F. This means
we must show that
u is easily reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C and
u is easily
reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
) in
C.
By the effect of the action in the spec,
u
 
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s, so
u is obviously easily
reachable from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
 
A
 
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
 
) in
C. Since
u
 
U
 
N,
u is obviously easily reachable
from
t
 
 
E
v
e
(
C
 
P
 
A
)
 
h
a
s
 
(
U
 
N
) in
C.
Lemma 9.3
S
6 implements
S
7.
The proof of Lemma 9.3 is easy, based on the following
two lemmas:
Lemma 9.4
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
A
 
 
N
 
N
 
) implements
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
N
)
 
E
n
v
(
U
 
A
 
 
N
 
).
Lemma 9.5
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
 
P
 
 
A
 
) implements
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
A
)
 
I
C
(
U
 
P
 
 
A
 
).
This all yields:
Lemma 9.6
S
6 implements
S
5.
Proof: By Lemmas 9.3 and 9.2.
Theorem 9.7
S
6 implements
P
C
(
U
 
P
 
M
 
A
).
Proof: By Lemmas 9.6 and Theorem 9.1.
10. Discussion
In this paper, we have modeled and analyzed the com-
bination of simple shared key communication with Difﬁe-
Hellman key distribution, in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per adversary. Althoughthis example is very simple, many
kinds of decomposition are evident in its presentation. Un-
derstandingthese inasimplecontext isaprerequisiteforex-
tending them to more complicated protocols.
Webelievethatthistypeofpresentationisusefulinclari-
fyingprotocolissues. It alsohelpsinseparatingtheprotocol
issues from other issues, such as cryptosystem reachability
issues, which can be treated separately. It appears possibleto decompose the presentation in this paper even more, for
example, by deﬁning a notion of embeddings of cryptosys-
tems and obtainingthe results of Section 8 as consequences
of such theorems.
Inworkinprogress,we areextendingtheseideas tomore
complex protocolslike that of Difﬁe, Oorschot, and Weiner
[5], which tolerate more active adversaries. So far, it ap-
pears that the modeling/analysis ideas of this paper scale
well to the more complicated examples. Some issues that
arise inmodelingtheprotocolof[5] are: The cryptosystems
are more complicated, somore complicatedarguments need
to be made about reachability; for example, the analogues
of the set
W deﬁned in Section 8.1.1 become more compli-
cated. Also, because the adversary has more active control
of the communication system, it is convenient to combine
them into a single automaton model. (The
h
a
s component
of that automaton is now used to decide what may be deliv-
eredtotheclient,aswellaswhatmayberevealed.) Also,the
correctness guarantees are weaker—for instance, repeated
deliveries of the same message, and deliveries to the wrong
recipient,are possible. Amore complicatedkeydistribution
service speciﬁcation will also be needed, including key re-
quests and granting of multiple keys.
The work of this paper has not mentioned liveness prop-
erties. For the simple case of this paper, with a passive
eavesdropper, liveness claims are certainly possible. They
can beincorporatedeasilyintothemodelintheformoftime
bounds, and proved using the usual assertional methods for
timinganalysis, suchasthoseappearingin[3,11]. Formore
active adversaries, more sophisticated algorithms can also
guarantee liveness properties, which could also be formu-
lated as time bounds and proved similarly.
Another interesting research direction is the modular in-
troductionof probabilisticconsiderations. We expect that it
is possible to accomplish a great deal at a high level of ab-
straction, by simply assuming that certain low probability
“bad” events do not occur. The low probabilitybad events
could then be introduced separately, with general theorems
usedtolimittheirimpact onsystem behavior. Butsuchgen-
eral theorems remain to be developed.
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